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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEED,
through its administratrix
MARY KAZAN,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
NEW ESCALANTE IRRIGATION
COMPANY,

Case No. 890426

Defendant/Respondent.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
New
agrees

Escalante

that

this

Irrigation

Court

has

Company,

jurisdiction

Defendant/Respondent,
and

agrees

with

the

Plaintiff/Appellantfs Statement as to the basis therefor.
Defendant Irrigation Company has historically diverted water
from the Escalante River and delivered the water to the lands of
its

shareholders

through

open

canals.

The

shareholders

have

applied the water to the irrigation of their lands by flood type
irrigation.

Some of the said lands drain toward the Escalante

River; other lands drain toward an adjacent natural wash known as
Alvey Wash.

In 1983 the open canals and ditches were changed to

a pressurized irrigation system, which more efficiently uses the
water.

Plaintiff

Steed

Estate

asserted

that

Plaintiff

had

a

vested right to receive the same level of return flow to Alvey
Wash

and

sought

an injunction, a replacement

order

and

money

2

damages.

After a trial, the court ruled against Plaintiff and

Plaintiff filed this appeal.
PARTIES
The correct name of the Defendant/Respondent is "New Escalante

Irrigation

Company"

—

not

"The

New

Escalante

Water

Company", as it appears on Appellant/Plaintiff's Brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Defendant Irrigation Company does not agree with the Plaintiff Estate f s Statement of Issues.

Defendant's water rights are

The Plaintifffs

all from the Escalante River.

rights are all

from Alvey Wash, which is in an adjacent water shed.

There is no

natural connection between the Alvey Wash and the Escalante River
above Plaintiff's point of diversion.
can get Escalante River water
Defendant

to divert water

Defendant's

rights;

through

system

its

stockholders

for
to

for Plaintiff's land is for the

from
the

the

The only way the Plaintiff

the Escalante

Defendant

lands

of

its

to

River

convey

under
that

stockholders

the

water

and

the

to apply the water to lands, some of which drain

toward the Alvey Wash.

The Plaintiff Estate is not a lower user

of water from the Escalante River.

The primary issue is whether

or not under this fact situation the Plaintiff, either by appropriation, or under the doctrine of adverse use, or otherwise, has
obtained a vested right to require Defendant to maintain the same
historic level of irrigation run-off to Alvey Wash.
The issue as to whether there is excess water, and the issue
as to whether excess lands are being irrigated, are collateral

3

issues which are more specifically identified in the Summary of
Argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Alvey Wash is a natural water s-hed with a drainage area of
some 102 square miles

(Tr. 347) .

It empties into the Escalante

River some 25 miles from the irrigated lands of the Plaintiff and
Defendant here involved

(Tr. 134) , but the Escalante River does

not naturally contribute any water to Alvey Wash (Tr. 133). Some
of

the

lands

irrigated

under

Defendant's

water

system

drain

toward Alvey Wash and the waste water commingles with the natural
flows

in

Alvey

Wash.

That

waste

reappropriation under Utah law.
Utah

and

elsewhere

that

such

water

is

subject

to

However, it is settled law in
waste

water

claimant

does

not

acquire, by virtue of such reappropriation, or by virtue of long
use, any right as against the original appropriator, to require
the run-off water to be maintained at its historic level.

This

is in contrast with the diversion of water from a stream and the
application of that water to the irrigation of lands from which
the return

flow is to the stream

from which

diverted.

Under

such

that

condition,

return

it was
flow,

initially
from

the

standpoint of the rights of use, is a part of the water supply of
that

stream.

The

rights

of

those

who

hold

appropriative rights in that stream attach thereto.

downstream
Thus, the

return flow is not subject to reappropriation.
This distinction is clearly made by the Utah cases and by
well respected writers frequently cited as authority by the Utah
Supreme Court.

4

Plaintiff

claims

that

through

the

system, excess water has been created.
undisputed evidence.

change

to

a

sprinkler

This is contrary to the

All of the water that Defendant Irrigation

Company has the right to divert in the Escalante River is applied
during each irrigation season to its shareholders1
with

the benefit of

storage

system, Defendant generally

and

the new

lands.

$2 million

Even

sprinkler

runs out of water during the late

Summer.

The trial court expressly found that there is no excess

water.

Plaintiff

Estate

ignores

both

the

testimony

and

the

findings on its claim of excess water.
Plaintiff

also contends

that over time there has been an

improper expansion of acreage by Defendant.

Plaintiff does not

advise the Court t-hat the Defendant has filed and perfected new
applications to appropriate.

Defendant's total perfected rights

at the time of the trial permit
2,712.28 acres.
demonstrate

its shareholders

to

irrigate

The trial court so found, and the evidence will

that

at

the

time

of

the

trial

the

Defendant's

shareholders were irrigating less than 2,700 acres.
Finally, it is Defendant's position that no change application is required, either

to change

from one tract of land to

another within the Defendant's irrigation system, or to change
from

a

direct

flow

application

of

the

water

to

a

sprinkler

system.
CITATION TO RECORD
We will refer to the pleadings, pre-trial order, etc. as the
Record (R.) and to the evidence which has been transcribed in two
volumes as the Transcript

(Tr.)

We mention this, because the

5

Appellant/Plaintiff's

brief

has

transcript would be renumbered
end of the Record.

apparently

assumed

that

the

in succession starting with the

The Transcript, as sent to the Respondent/De-

fendant has not been so re-numbered, and in the discussion to
follow we will refer to the Transcript page number which appears
in the upper right-hand corner of each page.

It probably will

need to be further numbered to conform to the citations used by
Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

It

PLAINTIFF ESTATE IS NOT A LOWER USER FROM THE
ESCALANTE RIVER. ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S WATER COMES
FROM ALVEY WASH.

should

be

noted

at

the

outset

that

the

Utah

State

Engineer filed a proceeding in the District Court initiating a
general adjudication proceeding.

In that proceeding the State

Engineer proposed a decree, and the court under date of July 27,
1977,

approved

the

uncontested

Proposed Determination

rights, as

(R. 93, & Ex. 7 ) .

set

forth

in that

The trial court here

so found (Finding No. 5, R. 325).
Plaintiff Estate's water rights are "strictly out of" Alvey
Wash

(Tr. 32) .

Alvey Wash has a drainage area of 102 square

miles (Tr. 396).
topographic map
upper part

Its drainage area is shown in dark blue on a
(Ex. 103) .

(Tr. 152) .

It is frequently a dry wash in its

There is a fairly substantial discharge

of water from Alvey Wash, but it is erratic
Part of the

land

irrigated

by Defendant

(Tr. 397,398,541).

Irrigation

Company's

shareholders naturally drains back to the Escalante River, and

6

part of it drains toward Alvey Wash

(Tr. 445) .

However, there

is no natural connection between the Escalante River and Alvey
Wash above Plaintiff's land.
Mr. Scott Steed, who operates the Plaintiff Estate's farm,
was asked (Tr. 133) :
Q.

Is there anything other than the company's system
where you can get water from the Escalante River into
the Alvey Wash except through the water system, open
canal or pipeline?

A.

To my knowledge, no.

Q.

Well they are not physically connected that high are
they?

A.

No. There is not a physical connection between the
two.

Dr. Allen, Plaintiff's expert, agreed (Tr. 359-60) .

There

is no evidence to the contrary.
In this regard, the trial court found (Finding 15, R. 326):
15. There is no natural contribution of water to
Alvey Wash from the Escalante River. The only Escalante
River water which reaches Alvey Wash above the plaintiff's
point of diversion, or otherwise, is the runoff and seepage
water from diversions of water by the defendant from the
Escalante River and the conveyance of said water through
its system to irrigate the lands of its shareholders. Part
of this water reaches Alvey Wash as run-off and seepage
water from the said irrigation.
We thus submit that Plaintiff Estate is not a lower user of
water from the Escalante River from which Defendant's water is
diverted.

We will demonstrate in our discussion of the applica-

ble law that under these facts the Plaintiff acquired no right,
either by appropriation, by adverse use, or otherwise, to compel
Defendant Irrigation Company, or its shareholders, to continue
to let the same amount of waste water run off their lands into
Alvey Wash.

7

POINT II• NO EXCESS WATER HAS RESULTED FROM THE CONVERSION
FROM A FLOOD TYPE IRRIGATION SYSTEM TO THE
SPRINKLER SYSTEM.
Plaintiff Estate

asserts

that the change

to a sprinkler

system has resulted in substantial amounts of excess water, and
argues that in equity the excess water should be shared with it.
Both

the evidence

and

the trial court's

findings

are to the

contrary.
The evidence is to the effect that a sprinkler system is
approximately
(Tr. 430).

25% more

efficient

With

flood

type

irrigation

Engineer Fred Duberow testified that the sprinkler

system does not make water
efficient

than

application

flood-type

of

(Tr. 434) , but because of the more

the water,

irrigation

the

the

plants

crops

at

the

consume more.
upper

end

are

over-watered, and the lower areas are under-watered (Tr. 434).
Barry Barnson, President of Defendant Irrigation Company,
testified that the pipe capacity is 33 c.f.s. and Defendant's
1919 Hayes Decree right, with an 1875 priority, is for 40 c.f.s.
The difference is now stored (Tr. 520); the company doesn't have
water

left

(Tr. 520) .

at

the

end

of

the

season

Normally the natural river

will not fill the pipeline

(Tr. 521).

—

"we

use

it

all"

flow in June and July
To pressurize the pipe-

line the Defendant Irrigation Company releases water

from its

reservoirs and normally must add about 16 c.f.s. from storage in
order
521) .

to augment

flows and

fill the pipeline

(Tr.

The company usually reaches a point each season when it

cannot do that.
water

the river

used.

There is then a reduction made in the amount of

This

is accomplished

by

reducing

the number

of

8

nozzles (Tr. 521).

On the day of the trial (June 15, 1989) the

pipeline system was totally off, because of lack of water (Tr.
158 & 522). The reservoirs were dry.

The small amount of water

in the8 stream was being diverted into storage to build up the
water

supply.

In five to ten days, with

a 50% reduction

in

nozzles, there would be enough stored water accumulated so that
the system could be reactivated for a few days (Tr. 522) .

The

pipeline cost a little over $2 million (Tr. 523).
McKay Bailey was the current water master, and he had used
water from Defendant Irrigation Company's system for 20 years.
He testified that in 1983 and 1984 there was plenty of water,
but at times the water supply was so low that the company gave
it all to the Town of Escalante to save the Town gardens (Tr.
528).

He also testified that two years ago the company ran out

of water in October, or the middle of September, and the water
was

totally

off

for ten days, and

then after a few days of

storage it came back on for a short time (Tr. 527).
Doyle Cottam had been the president of Defendant Irrigation
Company for 20 years.

His testimony concerning the operation

was the same as Mr. Barnson's (Tr. 529 & 530). Many years while
he was president the company ran out of water and gave what was
available to the Town (Tr. 530). Many years the supply was down
to 7 c.f.s., and some years down to 4 c.f.s.

(Tr. 530).

The

Defendant tries to maintain a tight earthen dam and to divert
all of the water available in the Escalante River at the company's point of diversion (Tr. 534).
The trial court found (Finding 21, R. 331), as follows:

9

. . .The original canal had a capacity of 40 c.f.s. The
sprinkling system has a capacity of 33 c.f.s. The balance
of the 40 c.f.s. of water is stored for use later in the
season, together with any water covered by subsequent
applications, as set forth above. Every season since the
sprinkling system was installed the defendant shareholders
have utilized all of the water available to the defendant
company under all of its rights, but they have applied less
water in the Spring and more water has been utilized from
the river and the reservoirs during the Summer season. The
water available to the defendant company in the late Fall
is generally inadequate to meet the needs of the shareholders to irrigate their lands and water use is curtailed.
Available direct flow water is then diverted into the
reservoirs and any available storage water is commingled
therewith and the combined water is distributed in turns
with some periods of total non-use. There is and has been
no excess water resulting from the sprinkling system, but
the sprinkling system has permitted the available water to
be applied to the land more efficiently. The use of the
sprinkling system is approximately 25% more efficient than
flood-type irrigation and has provided more late season
water for the decreed lands. The sprinkling system was
constructed at a cost of more than $2,000,000.
(Emphasis
added.)
POINT III. DEFENDANT IRRIGATION COMPANY HAS NOT IMPROPERLY
ENLARGED ITS ACREAGE.
Plaintiff Estate argues that there has been an unauthorized
expansion of acreage in the magnitude of 700 acres (Plaintiff's
brief,

pages

18

&

19)

and

then

reasons

occurred because of the sprinkler system.

that

this

expansion

Neither the evidence,

nor the trial court's findings, support that reasoning.
19

of

Company

its

brief

was

Plaintiff

irrigating
to

only
tell

notes

that

2,118
this

acres
Court

Defendant
in

1952.

that

after

Plaintiff

neglects

Defendant

filed and perfected new applications

At page

Irrigation
However,
1952

the

to appropriate

water from the Escalante River, and at the time of the trial had
the right to irrigate 2,712.28 acres.
One is Application to Appropriate No. 26833, Certificate
No. 6025.

It permits the diversion of water from the Escalante

10

River for storage in Wide Hollow Reservoir for the irrigation of
2,352.98 acres of land.

Said right has a priority of April 8,

1955, and is covered by Water User Claim 66.
the State Engineer's
page 181.

court-approved

It is set forth in

Proposed

Determination

at

The underlying documents for that Water User Claim

were introduced as Exhibit 109 (Tr. 456).
Another

application

Appropriate No. 33941.

filed

after

1952 was Application

to

It also permits diversion of water from

the Escalante River and storage in the Wide Hollow Reservoir.
That

application

was

approved

on

June

29,

1962.

Defendant

Irrigation Company elected to file Water User Claim No. 88 in
the pending general adjudication suit, in lieu of filing proof
of appropriation, pursuant to Section 73-3-16, Utah Code Anno.
1953, as amended.

See Appendix A hereto.

Water User Claim 88,

in combination with the Defendant's other rights, provides for
the

irrigation

of

2,712.18

acres

of

irrigated with supplemental water
various
documents

shareholders.
were

W.

introduced

U.
in

land,

part

of which

is

from other sources owned by

Claim

88

evidence

and

as

the

Exhibit

underlying
110.

See

Appendix B hereto.
Harold

Donaldson,

who

worked

for

the

State

Engineer's

Office for 37 years (Tr. 457) and was in charge of the preparation

of

the

court in 1977
Proposed

Proposed

Determination

which was

adopted

by

the

(Tr. 458-62) testified that the water under the

Determination

for

use

Company is for 2,712.28 acres

by

the

(Tr. 463).

Defendant

Irrigation

The underlying water

rights, change applications, etc., for the other rights of the

11

Defendant are in evidence as Exhibit 108 for W. U. Claim No. 21
and Exhibit 111 for W. U. Claim 1200 (Tr. 456-7).
The 1875 decreed right and the perfected applications since
then

(which

include

the

two

discussed

next

above) ,

and

Application 11155, which was filed in 1939, permit the Defendant
to irrigate 2,712.28 acres.

The trial court expressly so found

in Finding No. 16(d) (Tr. 327).

Finding No. 16 on Defendant's

water rights is as follows:
16. The lands historically irrigated by the shareholders of defendant from its diversions from the Escalante
River partly drain into the Escalante River and partly
drain into Alvey Wash.
The lands irrigated through the
defendant's system, which drain toward Alvey Wash, contribute run-off and seepage water to the natural flow of Alvey
Wash. Natural surface run-off in Alvey Wash is sporadic.
Flash floods periodically occur and produce large quantities of water, but the flood waters are laden with silt and
only the waters available during the tail-end of the flood
are suitable for and are used by plaintiff for irrigation.
Alvey Wash is a gaining stream and those who use water from
it generally maintain an earth-type dam completely across
the wash. Defendant's water rights are as follows:
(a) Defendant was awarded the right to use 40
c.f.s. of water from the Escalante River for irrigation by a decree entered by the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for the County of Garfield, on the
25th day of June, 1919.
That decreed water has a
priority of 1875 and the water was initially used by
direct flow diversion and was applied to the land by
flood-type irrigation.
The Hayes decreed right is
covered by Water User (W.U.) Claim 1200. Two change
applications have been filed thereon — and both were
approved.
One is Change Application a-1894.
The
other change application is a-5317. It was filed on
September 26, 1967. Under that change defendant was
permitted to store the said water in its reservoir now
known as the Wide Hollow Reservoir.
(b) Defendant also filed Application to Appropriate No. 11155, which was amended by Change Application
a-2829 and certificated under Certificate No. 5003.
Said application has a priority date of June 14, 1939.
The water therefor is diverted from the North Fork of
the Escalante River and the approved application
provides for storage in the North Creek Reservoir of

12

1,165.58 acre-feet of water. The water is also used
for irrigation. Said right is covered by W.U. Claim
21 in the State Engineer's Proposed Determination at
page 164.
(c) Defendant also filed Application to Appropriate 26833, which is certificated under Certificate
6025, which permits the diversion of water from the
Escalante River and the storage of that water in Wide
Hollow Reservoir for the irrigation of 2,352.98 acres
of land. Said right has a priority of April 8, 1955,
and is covered by W.U. Claim 66 in the State Engineer's Proposed Determination at page 181.
(d) Defendant also filed Application to Appropriate 33941 for the diversion of water from the Escalante River and storage in the Wide Hollow Reservoir.
Said application was approved on June 29, 1962.
Defendant elected to file W.U. Claim 88 in the pending
general
adjudication
suit,
pursuant
to
Section
73-3-16, Utah Code Anno. 1953, as amended. W.U. Claim
88 was duly filed and in combination with the other
rights of the defendant provides for the irrigation of
2,712.28 acres of land, part of which is irrigated
with supplemental water from other sources owned by
various shareholders. (Emphasis added)
At the time of the trial Defendant Irrigation Company was
supplying water for less than 2,700 acres.
Plaintiff Estate had Mr. Steed make an acreage computation,
using an aerial photograph.

He was asked

(Tr. Ill) how many

acres the Defendant's shareholders were cultivating in 1976 and
he answered

"about 1,825".

He then testified that in 1987 he

calculated the acreage as 2,600 acres, plus a few small pieces
added

since 1987.

He testified

(Tr. 113) that for the years

1985 and 1986 the average was between 2,530 and 2,600 acres.
Mr. Duberow, an engineer called by Defendant, testified of
an

acreage

study

he

made

in

1987.

He

used

a

1984

aerial

photograph and then went to the land and noted any new lands.
The

aerial

testified

photograph

how

he

is

computed

in

evidence

as

Exhibit

the

acreage, starting

105.

He

at Tr. 414.
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Exhibit

107

is his

computation

sheet

(Tr. 421) .

He

used

a

standard method to compute the acreage and concluded that the
total acreage being irrigated as of April 1987 was 2,778 acres.
(Tr. 422-424) .
Mr.

Donaldson, who

testified
official

that
maps

just

prepared

before

showing

the

the

the

Proposed

1989

trial

Defendant

Determination,

he

Irrigation

irrigated land when the official survey was made.
prepare

those

maps

(Tr.

458) .

He

took

went

on

the

11

Company's

He had helped

the

ground

and

compared the land being irrigated about a month before the trial
(Tr. 463) .

He plotted the changes on the official hydographic

survey maps.

He listed the changes on Exhibit 113

(Tr. 466).

He concluded that Defendant's irrigated acreage one month before
the trial was 2,650 acres, but that this did not include some of
the Plaintiff Estate's land which was only partly irrigated with
Defendant Irrigation Company stock (Tr. 483). He testified that
Plaintiff was irrigating 148 acres

(Tr. 483) ; that 60 acres of

this was irrigated with Alvey Wash water rights; and that the
88-acre balance was irrigated from wells and with stock owned or
rented

in Defendant

Irrigation

Company.

Without

knowing

how

many shares Plaintiff Estate was using, he said he could not say
what part of the 88 acres should be added to the 2,650 acres
(Tr. 483). However, Mr. Scott Steed provided those figures.
testified

He

(Tr. 87) about the stock he had purchased and rented.

He testified that in 1988 he watered approximately 30 acres with
stock and said "we barely made 30 acres" and this year 1989, it
looks

like maybe

15 acres

(Tr. 89).

Thus,

at the

time Mr.

14

Donaldson made his study, Plaintiff was irrigating with company
stock between 15 and 30 acres.

When this is added to the 2,650

that Donaldson identified, it would bring the total irrigated
acreage up to 2,680.

These three witnesses are the only ones

who testified on Defendant's irrigated acreage.
We now turn to the applicable law.
POINT IV. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE A VESTED RIGHT TO FORCE
DEFENDANT TO MAINTAIN THE SAME LEVEL OF RUN-OFF,
OR TO PREVENT
DEFENDANT'S
SHAREHOLDERS
FROM
CHANGING TO A MORE EFFICIENT METHOD OF APPLYING
ITS OWN IRRIGATION WATER TO THEIR LANDS.
The three Utah cases
involved

relied

on by Plaintiff Estate all

lower users on the same stream.

The historic

return

flow, which was at issue in those cases, was to the same water
source

from which

the

upstream

appropriaror

had

diverted

his

water.

None involved situations such as we have here where the

run-off water is to a different natural water channel.
This is a critical distinction.

It is the distinction made

by the Court in East Bench Irr. Co. et al. v. Deseret Irr. Co.,
et

al., 2 Utah

appropriators

2d

had

170, 271 P.2d
filed

a change

449

(1954).

application

There
to

upstream

change

their

points of diversion so that water could be diverted into storage.
At page 180 of the Utah Reports the Court in East Bench cited
Smithfield

West

Bench

Irrigation

Co.

vs.

Union

Central

Life

Insurance Co., et al., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943), and 113
Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948), Lasson v. Seely, 120 Utah 679, 238

*Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 5 Utah 2d 53, 296
P.2d 723 (1956); East Bench Irr. Co., et al. v. Deseret Irr. Co.,
et al. , 2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954); and Piute Reservoir
Irr. Co., Deseret Irr. Co., et al. v. West Panguitch Irr. &
Reservoir Co., 12 Utah 2d 168, 364 P.2d 113 (1961)
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P.2d 418 (1951); and McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d
570

(1952) , and said that the upstream irrigator in East Bench

was contending that those cases should control -- and that under
those cases the upstream irrigator had the right to completely
consume all of the water which it diverts by using it over and
over again.
The Court in East Bench distinguished those cases by noting
that they did not involve the rights of upper and lower water
users on the same natural stream.

Said the court:

.There [where the waste water did not return to the
stream from which it was diverted] the waters in question
were originally diverted by an upper canal company and
reached the lower users1 lands only through that means after
they had been abandoned but before they had reached the
stream from which they were originally diverted.
It is
generally recognized that such lower user, even though he
may by appropriation acquire the right to use such waters as
reach his lands from such source, either directly from the
higher lands or through a natural water channel, can acquire
no right to have the upper user divert and bring such water
onto the upper user's land from where it will become available for the irrigation of the lower user's land before it
reaches the stream from which it was originally diverted.
The upper user in such case owed the lower user no obligation to bring such water to him; he could abandon the diversion from the stream altogether and thereby deprive the
lower user of all of such waste or surplus water.
Under
such conditions the lower user can acquire no vested right
against the upper user who first diverted the water from the
natural stream and brought it to him either by appropriation, adverse user, estoppel, acquiescence or other means,
to compel him to continue such practice.* But a lower user
of the water of a natural stream, as we have seen, acquires
a vested right as against all upper users that they shall
not increase the amount of water consumed after he makes his
appropriation by a change of place of diversion or place or
manner of use and thereby deprive him of the use of such
water, (emphasis added)
At this point, in Footnote 6, the Court cited and quoted
with approval from Hutchins

ff

. . .The Law of Water Rights. . ."

362-368; where this same distinction is made, as follows:
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Appropriations may generally be made of waste water which
has been abandoned by the original appropriators, but with
important qualifications. Generally, an independent right
to the use of abandoned or waste water can be acquired only
if the water has not yet returned to the stream from which
it was diverted.
If such water after abandonment has
re-entered a portion of the stream system from which it was
originally appropriated, as noted in greater detail below,
it becomes a part of that watercourse in legal contemplation
as well as physically, and from the standpoint of rights of
use, it is just as much a part of the flow as is the water
with which it is mingled; hence appropriative rights which
before the mingling have attached to the waters of the
stream attach with equal effect to the waste waters originally diverted from the stream and then abandoned into it,
so that an independent appropriation cannot then be made of
the waste waters as such. . . . (emphasis added)
Hutchins, then after noting that where the waste water goes to
another channel it is open to reappropriation, said:
11

. . . These waste-water appropriations, however, are not
vested with all the attributes of a true appropriative
right, for it appears to be settled that the waste-water
claimant does not thereby acquire, solely by virtue of such
appropriation, a vested right as against the original
appropriator to have the practice of wasting water for his
particular benefit continue. . . . " (emphasis added)
Numerous

cases

from

many

western

states

are

cited

by

Hutchins, including the Utah case of Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah
260, 125 P. 867 (1912) .
In

the

Garns

v.

Rollins,

case

the

owner

of

land

had

collected into a pond water from a large number of streams and
from springs, seepage and percolation and from an artesian well
sunk on his land.

The water was conveyed

from the pond by an

"artificial water course" and used to irrigate 36 acres of land.
The waste, or run-off, water had been used by another for nine
years and he asserted the right to continue to receive the water.
The court held that while

artificial

flow claimants may have

priorities among themselves, they have no right to require the
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original

appropriator

to

continue

to

divert

natural supply and maintain the historic flow.

water

from

the

Said the Court:

The law is well settled, in fact the authorities all agree,
that one landowner receiving waste water which flows, seeps,
or percolates from the land of another cannot acquire a
prescriptive right to such water, nor any right (except by
grant) to have the owner of the land from which he obtains
the water continue the flow. . . .
The Court then

(page 272) quoted with approval from 1 Weil

Water Rights in the Western States (3d ed.) at page 50:
While artificial flow claimants may thus have priorities
between themselves, they can have no right of continuance
against the owner of the natural supply (the appropriator on
the natural stream. . . ) , except by grant, condemnation, or
dedication (or by the rule of compulsory service where the
water is distributed to public use). The chief instance of
artificial flows in practice is where some stream owner has
carried water to a distance and, after use, discharges it
below his land or works. . . .Seeing the water come down,
other parties arrive, build ditches below, receive the water
and put it to use. Yet unless they have a contract with the
stream owner, they must generally rely upon continued
receipt from him of such water at their peril. In such case
the creator of this artificial flow may cease to allow it to
escape.
The Court (at 41 Utah 273)

also quoted

with

approval from

pages 52 and 54 of Weil, as follows:
In the absence of contract, the natural water right owner
may cease the abandonment of waste from a ditch, and so use
the water that none of it thereafter runs waste, or so that
it runs off in a new place where people below no longer can
get it. Long receipt by them of the water of itself gives
no permanent right to have the discharge continued, whether
by appropriation, prescription, or estoppel, even though the
lower claimants built expensive ditches or flumes to catch
the waste.
Waste water soaking from the land of another after irrigation need not be continued, and may be intercepted and taken
by such original appropriator, and conducted elsewhere,
though parties theretofore using the waste are deprived
thereof.
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Plaintiff

Estate here

asserts

that Weil

and Hutchins

are

"old" authorities, but the Utah Supreme Court cited these very
quotes

from Weil

in

Smithfield

West

Bench

Irr. Co, v.

Union

Central Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, at p. 471 in 1943; and Hutchins
is cited in 1952 in McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d
570.

There is an unbroken line of cases since the 1912 Garns v.

Rollins decision to the same effect, and the rule is cited as
settled law.
In Stookey v. Green, 53 Utah 311, 178 P. 586

(1919), the

Court interpreted its holding in Garns v. Rollins to be that

l!

.

. .the run-off, waste and seepage from irrigation are not subject
to appropriation as against the owner of the land irrigated who
desires to recapture it and apply it on his own land".
In Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union Central Life Ins.
Co., et al., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943), and on rehearing
113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948), the ownership of waste water
was

elaborately

discussed.

The

court

was

again

dealing

with

excess water running off irrigated land and not returned to the
source from which it was diverted.

The court again held that the

person reappropriating these waste waters "can acquire no right
under which he can prevent the upper user from making use of such
water or compel the upper user or appropriator to let such water
continue to flow down to him." (page 4 72)
Justice

Wade,

in

a

concurring

opinion

at

pages

482-483

expressly stated that:
. It is well established, both in this state and in
other western states, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, that the original appropriator may change its
manner of use, or use the water over and over again, as long
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as it does so in good faith, and such water does not escape
from its property and control, . . • (emphasis added)
This, said Justice Wade, is true, even though in the past such
water has been allowed to flow onto the property of another who
has there put it to beneficial use, and such change in use by the
original appropriator has interfered therewith.
On rehearing, the Court stated:
. . .It is well established under the authorities cited in
our previous opinion that waters diverted from a natural
source, applied to irrigation and recapture before they
escape from the original appropriatorfs control, still
belong to the original appropriator.
If the original
appropriator has a beneficial use for such waters, he may
again reuse them and no one can acquire a right superior to
that of the original appropriator.
We next note the case of McNaughton et ux v. Eaton et al.,
121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d

570

(1952).

In McNaughton there was a

natural wash adjacent to irrigated land.
therein from natural sources.

Some water accumulated

Sometimes excess water (excess to

the needs of the shareholders) was diverted by the canal company
from other sources under its rights, and this excess water was
released directly into the natural wash.

Also, waste water which

had theretofore been used to irrigate lands on both sides of the
wash

drained

into

the wash

above

plaintiff's

diversion.

The

court squarely held that all three of these water sources

(the

natural flows, the excess water and the waste water) were subject
to reappropriation

from the wash, again citing, with approval,

the above discussion by Hutchins.

The court then squarely held

that the reappropriator acquired no right as against the original
appropriator to have the waste water continue to escape to the
wash.

Said the court:
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. . . But the reappropriator of such waters cannot require
that the first appropriator shall continue to waste such
waters, so that they will be available for use by the
reappropriator.
The original appropriator, as long as he
has possession or control thereof, may sell or transfer the
right to the use of such waters to someone other than the
reappropriator as long as he does so in good faith and they
are beneficially used, or he may recapture and use them for
further beneficial use if he does so before they get beyond
his property and control. (Emphasis added)
The issue was also presented

in Stubbs v. Ercanbrack, 13

Utah 2d. 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962), where the court said at page
50:
.the waters produced in these drains are not waste
waters as referred to in the usual sense, nor did the trial
court find them to be such. It did find that they resulted
both from the irrigation of the defendant's higher ground
and from the underlying water table.
We are quite in
harmony with the idea that water rights could not be acquired in waste water so that the defendant would be obliged
to continue to irrigate his higher ground to provide water
to be collected in the plaintiffs1 drains. . . . (Emphasis
added)
During
Utah cases

this same time

frame this Court decided the three

relied on by the Plaintiff, in which the return flow

was to the stream

from which it had been originally diverted,

where the protestants were lower users of water
stream.
noted

from the same

In East Bench the original appropriator cited the cases

above

and

argued

that

under

those

cases

the

original

appropriator had the right to utilize all of the water and had no
duty to return any of the water to the stream.
context

that

the Court made

the distinction

It was in this
set

forth

above,

recognizing that the return flow should be returned to the stream

Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Linke, supra;
East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., supra;
Piute Reservoir Irr. Co. Deseret Irr. Co. v. West
Panguitch Irr. & Reservoir Co., supra.
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from which it was appropriated, if this is practical.

If it does

return to the stream, it is not subject to reappropriation, but
in legal contemplation is a part of the stream, and the rights of
the

downstream

appropriators

attach

thereto.

This

is

then

contrasted by this Court with a case like the present case, where
the water is diverted from a river, transported artificially by a
canal system, and after use for irrigation, the waste water is
permitted to escape to an adjacent natural water course.
these

facts,

limited
1954.

said

the

Court,

reappropriation.

The

Under

the

waste

water

is

subject

to

East

Bench

case was

decided

in

The Piute Reservoir case was decided in 1951.

v. Eaton, supra was decided in 1952.

McNaughton

It was in the McNaughton

case that this Court squarely held that the water was subject to
reappropriation,

but

the

appropriation

could

original appropriator to maintain the flows.

not

require

the

The Court, in East

Bench cited McNaughton v. Eaton on reappropriation, but held in
that such an appropriative right to the waste water is a limited
one.

While those claiming the right to use this artificial flow

may have priorities, as among themselves, they can have no right
to continuance of the flow as against the owner who originally
diverted
their
cited

the water

lands by
cases

from the natural

its canal

from

system.

numerous

supply

and brought

it to

This Court, in East Bench,

western

states

extensively from Hutchins, as noted above.

and

then

quoted

The clear holding of

ther court was that the reappropriator could not, by reason of
his appropriation, nor by adverse use, nor by
otherwise,

obtain

a

vested

right

against

long usage, or
the

original
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appropriator

requiring

him

to

continue

to

permit

the

same

quantity of water to flow off his land into the adjacent natural
water course, and that the right to receive the same level of
return flow is extended only to lower users of water from the
same source.

As noted, both Weil and Hutchins make this same

distinction.

The statement by Weil to that effect is quoted by

this Court with approval in Garns v. Rollins, supra, and is cited
again with approval in Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, at page 472.

The clear-cut

statement to this effect by Hutchins is set forth in detail in
the East Bench case, and is noted in McNaughton v. Eaton, supra.
Thus, this has been the established law in the State since
1912, and it is a rule applied by most of the western states.
is a distinction that makes sense.
not

divert

his

entitlement,

it

It

If an upper appropriator does
stays

in

the

river

and

is

naturally available in order of priority to the lower users.
There

should

be

no

rule

of

law

that

would

require

the

appropriator to artificially divert that water from the Escalante
River, to artificially convey that water through its irrigation
system, and to apply that water to the irrigation of land in a
way which will cause waste water to flow off of the land, so as
to maintain the same level of waste.
As noted next below, it has long been the policy of western
water law to encourage the efficient use of water, but there
would be no incentive to do so if the water saved could not be
used

by

the original

efficient facilities.

appropriator, who

constructed

the more
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POINT V.

STATE WATER POLICY.

This Court has frequently stated that it is the water policy
of the State of Utah to encourage the efficient use of water.
See American Fork Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d
188 (1951); United States v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434
(1924); and Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243,
289 P. 116 (1930) .
court

to

Irrigation

adopt

The rule that the Plaintiff Estate asks this

would

Company

sprinkling system.

discourage

has

spent

conservation.

more

than

$2

The

Defendant

million

for

A sprinkler system is more efficient.

a

If the

water conserved could not be used by those who make the expenditure, because

they are required

by

the courts

to continue

to

waste water at the same level as in the past, there would be no
reason to expend the money to make more efficient use.
POINT VI. THE DEFENDANT FILED AND SECURED APPROVAL OF CHANGE
APPLICATIONS TO STORE ITS DIRECT FLOW DIVERSION
RIGHTS IN THE NORTH CREEK AND WIDE HOLLOW
RESERVOIRS.
In each of the three Utah cases cited by Plaintiff, the
applicant proposed to construct a dam and to divert its direct
flow water rights into storage.

Change applications were neces-

sary in all three cases because in each of the cases the dam
which was to be constructed required a different point of diversion.

In one of the cases there were also proposed changes both

in place of use and in purpose of use.
The Defendant here was confronted with the need

for that

same kind of a change application when it proposed to construct
each of its reservoirs.

Defendant filed its change application,
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No. a-5317, to change its point of diversion, so that the direct
flow right under the Hayes Decree could be diverted into storage.
The use of storage was also involved under defendant's Application to Appropriate 11155, and Change Application a-2829 for the
North Creek Reservoir.

Had there been any lower users from the

Escalante River, those users would have been able to invoke the
same principle

as that applied

which Plaintiff Estate relies.

in the three

storage cases on

The change applications to store

Escalante River water in North Creek Reservoir and Wide Hollow
Reservoir were approved long ago (see Finding of Fact No. 16, R.
327, and Exs. 108, 109, 110 & 111), and are not before us in this
case.
POINT VII.TWO OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS COVERING TEN ACRES
OF LAND ARE BASED ON ADVERSE USE, AND RIGHTS
CANNOT BE ACQUIRED IN DEFENDANT'S WASTE WATER BY
ADVERSE USE.
Plaintiff Estate's Water User Claims Nos. 1272 and 1440 are
based on adverse use
tion) .

(see page 207 of the Proposed Determina-

Collectively, they are for ten acres of land.

The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a downstream
user cannot establish a right under the doctrine of adverse use
to water which an upstream user permits to flow off his land.
The matter is addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Smithfield
West

Bench

discussion

Irr. Co. v.
appears

Union

Central

Canal

Co., supra.

in Utah Reports, Vol. 105, at pages

The

471-3.

The court there said:
As to (a) the excess flow; the owner of a water right, after
diversion from the stream is the owner and entitled to
possession of the water itself, the corpus of the water as
long as he retains it in his ditches or reservoirs, on his
property or under his control.
(citing cases)
Once the

25

water has passed beyond these conditions it is no longer the
water or property of the prior user or appropriator. Under
such conditions an appropriator cannot complain of the use
of water by another below his point of diversion or place of
use. (citing cases) And for this reason a lower appropriator or user cannot adverse the upper appropriator as to any
water which the upper user willfully, or knowingly, or
unavoidably permits to pass his point of diversion or place
of use.
(citing cases) And he can acquire no right under
which he can prevent the upper user or appropriator to let
such water continue to flow down to him. . . . (emphasis
added)
See also the discussion in the East Bench case, supra; Garns
v. Rollins, supra, at page 273: Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v.
Lindsay Land & Livstock, 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d. 634 (1943); and
Weil, supra, at page 52.
POINT VIII.

NO CHANGE APPLICATION WAS REQUIRED TO MOVE
RENTED OR PURCHASED WATER FROM ONE TRACT CF
LAND TO ANOTHER TRACT OF LAND UNDER THE
DEFENDANT IRRIGATION COMPANY'S SYSTEM.

The matter is discussed

in Syrett v. Tropic & East Fork

Irr. Co. et al., 97 Utah 56, 89 P.2d 474 (1939).
unanimous

opinion

was written

The Court's

by Mr. Justice Wolfe.

In the

opening sentence the Court said that the principal question to
be determined is:
"Does a stockholder in a mutual irrigation company who
wishes to change the point at which he receives his water
from the company's irrigation canal, and use the water to
irrigate different lands than those which have theretofore
been irrigated by such water, have to make application to
the state engineer under the provisions of Section 100-3-3,
R.S.U. 1933, as amended by Chapter 130, Laws of Utah 1937?"
(Emphasis added)
The

holding

of

the Court

in answer

to

that

question

is

reflected in Headnote 1 as follows:
A change of "place of diversion or use" within statute
requiring approval of state engineer therefor does not take
place where a stockholder in an irrigation company seeks to
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change the point of delivery of the water to which he is
entitled from the company's canal or lateral where no other
independent appropriators than the irrigation company have
an interest in the canal or water.
The Court said that the situation would be entirely different

if the appellant

or the

irrigation

company

desired

to go

somewhere along the Sevier River and change the point at which
the water is taken from the river.

There the rights of other

independent

source

appropriators

from

that

would

be

involved.

But for the purposes of the statute, an irrigation company stands
as a single appropriator of all the water to which its stockholders are entitled and changes in place of use within the company
system do not require a change application.
of

any

system.

transfers

outside

the

Defendant

There is no evidence
Irrigation

Company's

In fact, the pipeline did not extend to all of the lands

irrigated by the canalsf and the system was contracted

(Tr. 47 &

145) .
We next note the case of Arnold v. C. & R. Ass'n, 64 Utah
534, 231 Pac. 622 (1924).

In that case the shareholder wanted to

change the place of diversion from the Huntington River, rather
than take water from the Huntington Canal.
last user on that river system —
Company

is

the

last

user

on

the

The company was the

as the Defendant
Escalante

River.

Irrigation
The

Court

upheld the right of the shareholder to make the change without
filing a change application.

The Court said:

. . .The case therefore is not one which involves a change
of the place of diversion by a water user of a stream where
other users of water from the same stream are or can be
affected. The defendant always had diverted water from the
Huntington river since its organization many years ago
through the Huntington canal, and therefore what was in fact
accomplished by the transfer of water from the Avery ditch
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to the Huntington canal was merely to increase the flow
somewhat through the Huntington canal. Whether the defendant used more or less water to flow through that canal to
accommodate its members did not, and cannot, constitute a
change of the place of diversion as contemplated by our
statute. (64 Utah at 540). (emphasis added)
Further, Defendant Irrigation Company fully discharges its
duty when it delivers the correct amount of water to each shareholder.

At that point it becomes his water and the user —

the company —

is responsible for its use.

duty to police that use.

not

The company has no

That is for the State Engineer.

The

trial court so held (R. 336) .
POINT IX. IT IS NOT NECESSARY UNDER UTAH LAW, OR THE LAW
ANYWHERE IN THE WEST, FOR A WATER USER TO FILE A
CHANGE APPLICATION TO CHANGE FROM FLOOD TYPE
IRRIGATION TO A SPRINKLER SYSTEM.
The first change application legislation was enacted in 1903
as a part of
amended

from

the original water
time

to

time, but

code.

The

throughout

statute has been
all

of

the

times

material to this action a change application has been required
under

only

three

specified

conditions:

(1) Where

there

is a

change in point of diversion from the natural water course; (2)
where there is a change in place of use; and (3) where there is a
change in purpose of use.
In 1983, when the change was made by Defendant Irrigation
Company

to a sprinkler

system, the change

application

statute

then in effect in material part provided:
Any person entitled to the use of water may change the place
of diversion or use and may use the water for other purposes
than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no
such change shall be made if it impairs any vested right
without just compensation.
(See Sec. 73-3-3, Utah Code
Anno. 1953)
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The statute was amended in 1987, but that amendment does not
change the above.

It now reads (Sec. 73-3-3(2)):

(a) Any person entitled to the use of water may make: (i)
permanent or temporary changes in the place of diversion;
(ii) permanent or temporary changes in the place of use; and
(iii) permanent or temporary changes in the purpose of use
for which the water was originally appropriated.
(b) No change may be made if it impairs any vested right
without just compensation.
Plaintiff cites no case in Utah, or elsewhere, holding that
a change application is necessary to change an irrigation practice

from

flood

cannot find one.

type

irrigation

to

a

sprinkling

system.

We

The Court can take judicial notice of the fact

that the application of water by a sprinkler system is a widely
used practice in the State and throughout the West.

The

fact

that there have been no cases requiring a change application is
significant.
The

administrative

interpretation

of

a

statute

by

the

administrative agency charged with administering the statute is
entitled to significant weight.

This Court has held that courts

can take judicial notice of the records of the State Engineer,
even though not introduced

in evidence.

See Lehi Irr. Co. v.

Jones, 115 Utah 136, 202 P.2d 892 (1949); and McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288

(1948).

We refer the court to

Exhibit A which was attached to our Post-Trial brief

(R. 271) ,

which is a copy of the change application form in current use by
the State Engineer's office.

Under paragraph 11, the blank form

calls for information regarding the "purpose and extent of use"
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and

the

purposes

are

listed

as

irrigation,

stock

watering,

domestic, municipal, mining, power and other.
We also attached as Exhibit B a copy of the instructions in
current use in the State Engineerfs office regarding the information required by paragraph 11 of the change application blank,
specifying the purpose and extent of use and the same uses are
again

enumerated

(R. 274) .

We

submit

that

irrigation

is the

"purpose" of use and that the "purpose" is not changed when an
irrigator changes to a sprinkling system.
POINT X.

THERE IS ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
FINDING NO. 28.

Finding 28 relates to the damage issue and the determination
by the trial court that Defendant Irrigation Company has no duty
to the Plaintiff Estate to maintain the historic flow to Alvey
Wash renders this issue moot.

Nevertheless, the evidence does

support it.
In Finding No. 28 the trial court found that in 1983 there
was adequate water; in 1984 the total amount of water available
was

582.7

delivered

acre-feet
to

the

and

that

Plaintiff

at

least

Estate;

in

364.9
1985

acre-feet
the

total

were
water

available was 472.6 acre-feet and the total water delivered to
the

Plaintiff

available

was

was

199.5

acre-feet;

not

measured,

but

in

the

1986

water

the

total

delivered

water
to

the

Plaintiff was at least 200.3 acre-feet; in 1987 the total amount
of water
162.2

available

acre-feet.

and

the amount

Plaintiff

support that Finding.

says

delivered
that

the

to Plaintiff
evidence

does

was
not
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Specifically, McKay Bailey testified
was plenty of water in 1983.
page

13 of Plaintiff

Mr. Steed agreed

Estate's brief

showing that there were

(Tr. 528) that there

it sets

(Tr. 127).

forth

582.7 acre-feet available

472.6 acre-feet in 1985.

At

an exhibit
in 1984 and

Plaintiff's Exhibit, which we believe

is No. 63, shows 346.9 acre-feet delivered to Plaintiff in 1984
and 199.5 in 1985.

The same exhibit shows no records for all of

Alvey Wash in 1986, but Mr. Scott Steed testified
he

had

kept

a

record

on

his

diversions.

His

(Tr. 77) that
readings

were

introduced in evidence as Exhibit 8, and in the upper right hand
corner of that five-page long-hand exhibit, the total acre-feet
figure is 200.3.

The same exhibit shows 162.2 for 1987.

POINT XI. RESPONDENT'S REPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
Counsel

for Defendant

Irrigation

Company,

in his

opening

statement, acknowledged that there is run-off to Alvey Wash from
the irrigation by the Defendant's shareholders —
the amount

(Tr. 376) .

the issue was

Plaintiff Estate, throughout its brief,

pleads for equity, asserting that the Defendant has excess water
and should share it, and that the sprinkler-induced shortage has
been severe.

We do not agree.

At the time of the trial the sprinkler system had been in
use

for

five

seasons

(Finding No. 5, R.
administered
thus

have

from

1983

to

1988.

the Court

found

324), the rights of the parties are being

on a four-acre-foot duty.
been

As

entitled

to

200

Plaintiff Estate would

acre-feet

for

its

50-acre

appropriative right and for its adverse right for 10 additional
acres (40 acre-feet).

We will address the Plaintiff's answer on
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adverse use rights below.

There was adequate water in 1983 and

1984 (Tr. 528) , and Mr. Steed testified that during those years
users did

not need

to go on turns

(Tr. 127) .

As noted

next

above, Plaintiff received 364.9 acre-feet in 1983 and 346.9 in
1984.

There

because

is

there

nothing

are

no

legally

wrong

downstream

with

users

such

(Tr.

diversions,

134) .

Excess

diversions, if unappropriated water exists, is permissible. See
Adams v. Portage Irr. Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d
648 (1938) But Plaintiff did have water in excess of its rights
in 1983 and 1984, and the sprinkler system was in use both years.
There was less water available in 1985, 1986 and 1987.

Even so,

as found by the Court, and as discussed above, Plaintiff got the
200

acre-feet

(199.5

in

1985)

under

its

appropriative

right

except in 1987.
Plaintiff blames Defendant for all its shortages, but Mr.
Dale Wilson testified that he and his family owned and operated
what

is

now

the

Steed

Estate

property

for

about

15

years,

starting in the 1950s, and that these were dry years when the
available water was marginal.
latter part of the season
the Alvey

Wash

users

They were short of water in the

(Tr. 172) .

upstream

converted to sprinkler systems

from

Mr. Steed testified that
the

(Tr. 160) .

Plaintiff's

land

all

They all maintained

dams clear across the stream channel and took all of the water at
their points of diversion
claimed

the

first

(Tr. 74) , and although the Plaintiff

priority

on

Alvey

Wash,

the

junior

appropriators, as shown by the river commissioner reports, were
diverting water throughout nearly all this period.

Mr. Steed,
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for Plaintiff, acquired 67J shares and moved the water from the
bench where Plaintiff would get the return flow to his Alvey Wash
land to the wash, where return flow is to the wash below him (Tr.
144) .
Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to the water under
conditions as they existed when Plaintiff's 1909 application was
filed.

At that time the defendant had no storage reservoirs.

The construction of those reservoirs permitted the storage of the
river water during the non-irrigation season and storage of the
excess flows during the high spring run-off, thereby making it
possible for Defendant to place more water on its lands.

This

obviously would increase run-off to Alvey Wash.
Plaintiff complains at acreage enlargement by Defendant.

As

noted above, the Defendant had a legal right to do so, because it
had perfected new appropriations.
also expanded

its Alvey Wash

By the same token, Plaintiff

acreage

from

60 acres under

its

appropriated and adverse use rights to 148 acres during the same
period.
wells

Plaintiff

also made new appropriations

(Tr. 34 & 483) .

because

they

were

of water

from

Plaintiff did not like to use the wells,

expensive

(Tr. 130) ,

and

of

poor

quality

(Tr. 356). Mr. Steed testified that prior to 1983 he watered 80
acres with Alvey Wash

and well water.

He also purchased

and

rented stock in Defendant Irrigation Company (Tr. 144). So what!
If one acquires new rights, acreage can be enlarged.
At the time of the trial on June 15, 1989, which normally
would be a high water period, the system was shut off dry and the
Town of Escalante was rationing water

(Tr. 158 & 522) .

But the
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Plaintiff wants a replacement order which will give Plaintiff the
benefit of the Defendant's reservoirs, and thus provide Plaintiff
with late season water.

Plaintiff wants the water delivered to

Alvey Wash through the $2 million pipeline system, rather than by
way of return flow.

It wants to promote a 1909

appropriative

right for Defendant's waste water, accumulating as part of the
erratic flow of Alvey Wash, for a firm right to Escalante River
water

under

the Defendant's

18 75 priority.

In

fact, what

he

seeks would put him ahead of the Defendant.
Plaintiff
filed

when

complains

water

was

because

sold, or

tracts within the system.

change
rented,

applications

were

or moved

different

to

Yet plaintiff did the very same thing

with water under water stock that it rented and purchased
144).

not

(Tr.

However, where the trial court held that the Plaintiff did

not, by its appropriated
right to require
run-off

to

right, or by adverse use, obtain the

the Defendant

Alvey

Wash,

the

to continue

Court

declined

the

same

level of

to

make

specific

findings on the amount of the waste water which had historically
found

it way to the Plaintiff's point of diversion by way of

run-off, (however, it varied year by year) nor as to the extent
of the diminution.

It did make Finding No. 28, indicating the

amount of water the Defendant had had available during the five
years the sprinkler system had been in use.
Plaintiff
Wash

(see page

claimed

the

first priority

on water

from Alvey

6 of Plaintiff's brief and Finding No. 19, R.

330), but the commissioner reports show that the others continued
to use that water.

Mr. Steed testified that each kept an earthen
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dam

across

the

stream

channel

above

Steed

(Tr.

138) .

Historically, all of the users in this area were short of water.
While Defendant has a 40 c.f.s. right in the Escalante River, the
river normally drops way below that

(Tr. 521 & 530) .

We have

already noted the testimony of Dale Wilson, the prior owner of
the Steed Estate land, who said the water supply was marginal
during his fifteen years of operation.
Defendant

Irrigation

Company

was

Mr. Steed admitted that

short

of

water

(Tr. 128).

Defendant, therefore, expended the money to build two reservoirs
and

spent

$2 million

efficiently

apply

for a sprinkler

the

available

system which would

water

to

the

land.

If

more
the

Defendant had had plenty of water, it would not have expended
money for either the reservoirs or the pipeline.
Plaintiff's
adverse

the

answer

to

Defendant

is

recognized those two rights.

our

assertion

that

the

that

it

Proposed

could

not

Determination

However, it does not say that the

adverse use ran against the Defendant.

One cannot obtain the

right to use the unappropriated water by adverse use, or by long
usage.

This Court squarely so held in Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah

517, 189 P. 701 (1948); it is doctrine which applies to already
perfected rights.

See Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay

Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634 (1943).
If one user acquires part of another user's right by adverse
use,

the person

adversed

would

lose

part

of

his

right.

The

Proposed Determination does not so decrease any of Defendant's
rights.

There is absolutely no authority anywhere in the West to
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the effect that adverse use will run against waste water flowing
from irrigated land, and Plaintiff cites none.
CONCLUSION
In this Court's often cited discussion from Hutchins, supra,
the title of that section is:
"Waste Water May Be Appropriated Before it Has Returned to
the
Stream
From
Which
Originally
Diverted,
Within
Limitations, but as a General Rule the Original User is
Under No Obligation to Continue the Waste11, (page 362)
The law is settled to this effect in this jurisdiction

—

and has been settled for 78 years.
Plaintiff

has

no

water

rights

in

the

Escalante

River.

Plaintiff has no interest in the Defendant's appropriations from
the Escalante River.
its diversion dam.

Plaintiff does not help Defendant maintain
Plaintiff has no interest in the Defendant's

canal, or pipeline system.
two

storage

Plaintiff did not help pay for the

reservoirs, nor

the

$2 million

sprinkler

system.

Plaintiff is trying to "boot strap" its appropriations from Alvey
Wash, which

is erratic

in its

flows and has customarily

been

short of water, into a priority equal to, or superior to, the
Defendant's appropriations in the Escalante River.

The law, as

applied in Utah, is widely followed throughout the West.
fundamental rule defining property rights.

It is a

If the rule were to

be changed so as to be applied as Plaintiff seeks to apply it, it
would discourage the efficient use of water.
that 100% of the historic

artificial

If the rule were

flow must be maintained,

there would be no incentive for anyone to line canals, or install
sprinkler

systems,

and

no

incentive

to

more

efficiently

use
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water.

No

one

would

expend

the

money

needed

to

increase

irrigation efficiency (which will always involve the consumption
of

more

water)

if

he

could

not

have

the

benefit

of

his

expenditure.
We respectfully submit that the trial court was correct, and
that its judgment should be affirmed.
Dated this /7

day of May, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,

Edward W. Clyde, Attorney/for
Defendant/Respondent New
Escalante Irrigation Company

APPENDIX A
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended
73-3-16. . . .Statement in lieu of proof of appropriation or
change. . . .
In those areas in which general determination proceedings
are pending, or have been concluded, under chapter 4 of Title 73
of this Code, the state engineer may petition the district court
for permission to waive the requirements of this section and of
section 73-3-17 as to proof of appropriation and proof of change
and

as

to

certificate

issuance
of

of

change,

certificate
and

to

of

permit

appropriation
each

owner

of

and
an

application to file a verified statement to the effect that he
has completed his appropriation or change and elects to file a
statement of water users claim in such proposed determination of
water rights or any supplement thereto in accordance with and
pursuant

to

chapter

4

of

Title

appropriation or proof of change.

73,

in

lieu

of

proof

of

Form in

APPENDIX

B

(Part of

25M 4-<53

Exhibit

1 1 0 )

IN THE .... sixrc

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR THE

COUNTY OF

STATE OF UTAH

WAYNE

IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF ALL WATER, BOTH SURFACE
AND/JNDJSRGkOUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE
COL6RADO RIVER I N UTAH, EXCLUDING THE GREEN RIVER
DRAINAGE AND THE VIRGIN RIVER DRAINAGF AREA.

\ STATEMENT OF WATER
) USERS CLAIM
f CODE NO
SERIAL NO
(
97
30
\
/

MAP

NO

62c & 62d

NOTE This blank is sent to you in accordance with Utah Law The information called for herein will be used in coo
nection with the adjudication of water rights on the above mentioned drainage area All questions applicable to your claim
must be answered fully, and one copy of this form must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court at
, Utah, within sixty (60) days from date of service of the atuched Notice A copy shall be
filed with the State Engineer, State Capitol, Salt Lake City Failure to file the atuched Sutement of the Water User s
Claim with the Clerk of the District Court within the time stated will forever bar and estop you from asserting any nght
to the use of water from said drainage area.

1 Name of Claimant

New

2 Address

E s c a l a n t e , Utah

Escalarite Irrigation Company
f u l 1

Interest Claimed

84726

3 Name of particular sffifflgpfftggjjftaS^: stream, 33fclp^MK&eX2&a&*1h from which water is diverted is

*•!- Escalante Mver & #2- Wide Hp*lowinT7a.sh

in

Garfield

County

4

Priority date claimed D e c e m b e r 2 , 1 9 6 9
Date when water was first used
Date when work on diverting system was first begun
Date when diverting system was completed
Nature of work
5 Class of Right (Indicate by X)
(a)
Right to surface water initiated by beneficial use before 1903 Claim No
(b)
Right to underground water initiated before 1935 Claim No
(c)
Right decreed by court, cite title of case
(d) £X Application filed, State Engineer s Office No 3 3 9 4 1
Cert, of App No
Election
(e)
Right acquired by adverse use prior to 1939
6 Nature (Indicate by X ) , Amount, and Annual Period of Use (by month & day)
(a) ?Q? Irrigation
Sec Ft
from
March Z
to O c t o b e r 3 0
(both dates mcl)
(b)
Stockwatenng Sec Ft
from
to
(both dates mcl )
(c)
Domestic
Sec Ft
from
to
(both dates inci)
(d)
Municipal
Sec Ft
from
to
(both dates inci)

(d^sqgeStorage
7

KSXR 2324,53 £oW March 2

to

October 30

(both dates mcl)

Direct Flow Appropriation (must be described with reference to U S Government Survey Corner)
(a) Point of diversion from s^g£3£w£agXii2fl£ stream, wi2$2QD&pa&i2fi

# 1 - M» 210 f t . and E. 8Q0 f t * frcrax t h e Bk c o r , S e c , 10* T35S*. £ 2 $ , sum.
£ 2 - S - 605 i t . and. W* 275 fJt* frcna t h e l\k c o r . S e c . 1 2 # T35S* E2E, SLB&*«
(b) Description of spring area
(c) Point of rediversion or point of return to natural channel
(d) If flow is intermittently diverted, list by number or description, all rights involved
8 Where water is used for irrigation purposes
(a) Area irrigated in legal subdivisions of land by 40-acre tract (All sources of water for same land or lands must
be described in each instance by name or claim number)

SHE ATTACHED SHEETS.

9

(b) Do you get water under a ditch owned by several users
divisions of interest
Where water is used for Stockwatenng
(a) Number of each kind of stock watered
(b) All sources of water for same stock (Describe by name or claim number)

10 Where water is used for Domestic
(a) Number of families or their equivalent

If so, give names of all users and

11

Where water is used for Municipal Purposes
Population

( a ) Name of city or town supplied

Quantity of water

Number of families
12

Where water is used for a purpose not above enumerated
Extent of Use

( a ) Nature of Use

Appropriation for Storage Purposes
( a ) Name of reservoir

W i d e

Hollow Heservoir^

( b ) Location of reservoir by legal subdivisions described by 40 acre tract* S W $ ,

SU^SE^ S e c .

1 , E^SE„,

Sec. 2, NE%NE% S e c . 1 1 , I^NV X, NW^NEi S e c . 12, T35S, R2E, SIMM.
( c ) Maximum capacity of reservoir in acre feet
Completed

*

Water first used
M a r c h

( d ) Period of Storage from

2
t o

°

4
C t

*

Year construction commenced

.

Is reservoir located on or off stream

**0

(both date? i n c l )
}

(both dates incl ) Maximum area in acres inundated
Average depth in feet
year

Is reservoir drained each year

^^

Period of use from

* 'J

****—}

*

Max depth in feet

Maximum

number

of fillings

per

If feeder canal i s used, give maximum

1$ reservoir used for equalizing purposes

carrying capacity in sec ft
Diverting Works
( a ) Surface water diverting dam

Material composed of

Max

Max

length

height

Max width

Max width at bottom

at top
( b ) Underground water diverting works
Diameter of well

Is well flowing or pump

Length of drain

Diameter of dram

Length of tunnel

Type of pump

Depth of well

Width of dram
Width of tunnel

Depth of dram
Height of tunnel

Capacity of pump

( c ) Surface and underground water conveying works
ditch at top

Length of ditch to first place of use

Width of ditch at bottom

ditch per 1000 ft

Material through which

pipe line to first place of use

Width of

Depth of water

Grade of

ditch passes

Maximum length of

Diameter of pipe line

Grade of pipe line per

1000 feet
The undersigned hereby enters his appearance and waives service of summons or other process
STATE OF U T A H
SS

( T o be used if claimant is an individual)

C O U N T Y OF
being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is the claimant
whose name appears hereon, that he has read the foregoing statement of his claim and knows the contents thereof, that
he has signed the same, and that the answers set forth therein are true to his best knowledge and belief

Signature of Claimant
day of

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

19

N O T A R Y PUBLIC
STATE OF U T A H
(SS
C O U N T Y OF 5 2 > j k ^ C 4 ^ /
***^LlL*JftiL+
Z^4&<4rC+\J^

( T o be used if claimant is a corporation or an estate)

)

KA+x-JS^-uA,

, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says that he is ihe

If

of the above claimant, that he makes this certification on behalf of said

claimant, that he has read the foregoing statement of claim and knows the contents thereof, and that he has signed the name
of said claimant to said statement, that the answers set forth thereirr are true toyhis best knowledge and belief

/.< / />
Subscribed and sworn to before me

this

/*

day of , ° 0 ^ - ^ '

i

NOTARY

19 ?f

PUBLIC

Water U s e r ' s Claim 9 7 - 8 8 , New E s c a l a n t e I r r i g a t i o n Company
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 1 , 8 8 , 1200 o n ;
7 . 8 0 a c s . SE%SE%, S e c . 1 0 , T35S, R2E, SLB&M, 5 . 7 0 a c s , SE%NE%, 5 . 6 0 a c s . NE^SW^;,
6 . 9 0 a c s . NW%SW%, 1 4 . 9 0 a c s . SE%SW%, 1 0 . 2 0 a c s . SW%SW% S e c . 1 1 , T35S, R2E, SLB6M;
0 . 2 0 a c . WfyNW*, 1 3 . 2 0 a c s . SEiNfci, 2 0 . 1 0 a c s . SU%NWi, 2 . 3 0 a c e . KW&>U*;, S e c . 1 2 ,
T35S, R25, SLB&M, or a t o t a l o l 8 6 . 9 0 a c r e s .
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1200 o n ;
1 5 . 6 0 a c s . W^Mky 7 . 3 0 a c s . NE^iV1-, 1 2 . 7 0 a c s . SE^NE%, 1 2 . 4 0 a c s . SW%NEfc,
1 0 . 6 0 a c s . SE%NW%, 8 . 6 0 a c s . NE^SE*;, 4 . 2 0 c c s . NW£SE%f S e c . 1 2 , 7 3 5 3 , R2E, SLB&M;
1 8 . 2 0 a c s . NE-kNE>, 2 0 . 1 0 a c s . NWiNEi, 1 7 . 3 0 a c s . :ffi£NW%, 1U.60 a c s . NW-kNT?:,
17.CO a c s . SE%NE%, 2 1 . 3 0 a c s . SU<NSv, 1 0 . 7 0 a c s . SL,\^%
1 7 . 1 0 a c s . EWiKfci,
1 3 . 0 0 a c s . NE^SEt, 1 4 . 8 0 a c s . nfci£Efc, 7 . 9 0 c c s . SE^SWfc, 9 . 3 0 a c s . NWiSW%» 1 0 . 8 6 act
SE%SE£ S e c . 7 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 2 . 0 0 a c s . NW%NWif 1 2 . 5 0 a c s . NW£SW%, 6 . 3 0 a c s .
SEiSE%, 1 0 . 0 6 a c s . SW%SE%, 2 2 . 0 7 a c s . SE\fiUk$ 1 9 . 0 4 a c s . SW^SWi, S e c . 8 , T35S,
R3E, SLB&M; 0 . 6 0 a c . SW%SW% S e c . 9 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 6 . 0 0 a c s . NWiNwi, 0 . 2 0 a c .
SW%NW%, 1 . 6 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 1 9 . 2 0 a c s . NW%SW%, 1 7 . 3 0 a c s . SE^SW%, 3 4 . 5 0 a c s ' . SW%SW%
S e c . 1 6 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . NS$NE%, 2 0 . 4 0 a c s . INU-VJNEV, 1 3 . 3 5 a c s . NEtfflrt
1 7 . 3 8 a c s . HW%HWi, 2 . 7 0 a c s . SS^N2%, 1 0 . 7 8 a c s . SW^NEi, 2 3 . 2 1 a c s . SE£NW%, 2 1 . 7 4 ac
SW%HW%f 3 1 . 6 0 a c s . NS?£E%, 3 9 . 1 0 a c s . InCiSE-V, 3 6 . 5 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 3 8 . 9 0 acs.'NW^SWi,
1 2 . 9 0 a c s . SE%SE£, 1 9 . 1 0 a c s . SW%SE%, 1 0 . 1 0 a c s . SE%SW%, 3 . 9 0 a c s . SW*SW% S e c . 1 7 ,
T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 3 . 5 0 a c s . NE%NE%, 4 . 3 9 a c s . SE%NE%, 2 9 . 9 0 a c s . NE%SE%, 1 1 . 1 0
a c s . SEiSE%, 1 2 . 0 0 a c s . SU^SE-VScc. 1 8 , T35S, R3E, SL36&; 2 5 . 2 0 a c s . NE%NE%,
4 1 . 3 0 a c s . NW^NE%, 3 2 . 6 0 a c s . NE%NW%, 3 9 . 2 0 a c s . SE%NE%, 2 6 . 8 0 a c s . SW%NE%,
2 9 . 6 0 a c s . SE-iNUi, 1 . 0 0 a c s . SW%HWif 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . NE^SEi, 3 5 . 8 0 a c s . NW^SE%,
3 5 . 0 0 a c s . NE?£W£t 5 . 6 0 a c s . NlJ-iSWl;, 2 7 . 6 0 a c s . SE%SS%, 3 4 . 2 0 a c s . STvVSEi,
2 6 . 3 0 a c s . SE-iSW£f 1 . 2 0 a c s . SWiSWfe S e c . 2 0 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 2 2 . 5 0 a c s . NE*NW£,
1 1 . 8 0 a c s . NW&JVJ^, 1 2 . 3 0 a c s . SW#JW%, 4 . 0 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 3 6 . 3 0 a c s . NW%SW%, 1 3 . 7 0
a c s . SW^SE%, 2 5 . 6 0 a c s . SE*SW%, 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . SW*SW% S e c . 2 1 , T 3 5 S , R3E, SLB&M;
5 . 5 0 a c s . SWjJSW*;, S e c . 2 7 , T 3 5 S , R3E, SLEc-M; 2 1 . 0 0 a c s . H ^ E i ; , 3 S . 3 0 a c s . HE#iW%,
4 0 . 0 0 a c s . NW%NW%, 1 0 . 1 0 a c s . SU&Zk, 1 0 . 0 0 a c s . SE^W£, 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . SW^Wi, S e c .
2 8 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 1 9 . 6 0 a c s . NE%NE%, 2 9 . 4 0 a c s . NW£NE£, 1 8 . 7 0 a c s . NE^NWi,
3 5 . 4 0 a c s . SEiNE 1 -, 2 1 . 4 0 a c s . SW;;:,_^, 5 . 4 0 a c s . SE^NW%, 2 . 9 0 a c s . NE!;SEt t 3 9 . 0 0 ace
NW%SE%f 4 0 . 0 0 a c s . SE%SE%, 2 8 . 0 0 a c s . SW%SE% S e c . 2 9 , T35S, R3i£, SLB&M; 4 0 . 0 0 a c s .
mlMk,
2 3 . 0 0 a c s . NW^NE^, 1 0 . 6 0 a c s . SZ#U%t 2 . 8 0 a c s . SW^NE^, S e c . 3 2 , T35S, R3E,
SLB&M; 3 5 . 1 0 a c s . KE-i»J24, 2 3 . 2 0 a c s . NW^NEi, 4 2 . 0 0 a c s . NE%NW%, 3 8 . 9 0 a c s . NWiNW%,
1 1 . 6 0 a c s . SW&iE%t 2 0 . 4 0 a c s . SE£NW-it 2 8 . 0 0 a c s . SW%flW%, 1 0 . 5 0 a c s . :1W%SE4,
3 8 . 9 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 2 3 . 8 0 a c s . NW%SW%, 2 . 1 0 a c s . SW%SEi, 2 9 . 5 0 a c s . SE£SW%, 3 7 . 0 0
a c s . SW%SW% S e c . 3 3 , T35S, R3E, SL36M; 2 8 . 3 0 a c s . NE^SW% S e c . 3 4 , T 3 5 S , R3E,
SLB&M; 1 5 . 6 0 a c s . SE?4W%, 1 3 . 6 0 a c s . SW^NW^, 1 7 . 2 0 a c s . SE%SW%, 7 . 4 0 a c s . SW^SW%,
S e c . 3 , T 3 6 S , R3fi, SLB&L; 2 4 . 8 0 a c s . NE%NW%, 9 . 5 0 a c s . M-7%IIW%, S e c . 4 , T 3 6 S ,
R3E, SBD&M; 1 5 . 6 0 a c s . NE£NW%, 1 2 . 0 0 a c s . NW%NW%, S e c . 1 0 , T 3 6 S , R3E, SLB&M,
or a t o t a l of 2»352.98 a c r e s .
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 6 , 1 2 , 1 9 , 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1 2 0 0 , 1 2 5 0 , 1251 o n ;
4 . 7 0 a c s . NE^NEi, 2 . 8 0 a c s . SE^fE%, S e c . 7 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M; 1 2 . 7 0 a c s . NW%KW%,
9 . 4 0 a c s . SE%NW%, 2 9 . 7 0 a c s . SW^NW%, 2 3 . 0 0 a c s . NE%SW%, 7 . 6 0 a c s . NW}£W%, S e c . 8 ,
T35S, R3E, SLB&M, o r a t o t a l o f 8 9 . 9 0 a c r e s .
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 5 8 7 , 1200 o n ;
3 . 1 0 a c s . NW^NW% S e c . 8 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M, o r a t o t a l o f 3 . 1 0

acres.

W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 , 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1200 o n ;
1 3 . 5 0 a c s . SE%SE%, 3 . 0 0 a c s . SW^SE^, S e c . 2 1 , T 3 5 S , R3E, SLB&M, 1 8 . 0 0 a c s .
NE%NE£, 7 . 5 0 a c s . SE^NE-V, S e c . 2 8 , T35S, R3E, SLES^, o r a t o t a l o f 4 2 . 0 0 a c r e s .
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 , 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1 2 0 0 , 1226 o n ;
1 9 . 1 0 a c s . SE£NS%, S e c . 2 8 , T35S, R3E, SLB&M, o r a t o t a l o f 1 9 . 1 0 a c r e s .
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 2 1 , 6 6 , 8 8 , 1 1 8 0 , 1200 o n ;
0 . 4 0 a c . NW?£W%, 1 6 . 8 0 a c s . SE*SW%, 7 . 5 0 a c s . SW%SW%, S e c . 2 7 , T 3 5 S , R3E, SLB&M,
0 . 3 0 a c . IiE^iW?;, S e c . 2G, T35S, R3~, SLB&M, o r a t o t a l o f 2 5 . 0 0 a c r e s .
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 3 , 2 1 , 6 6 , 3 3 , 1 2 0 0 , 1272 o n ;
3 . 4 0 a c s . NE-iSE%, 1 0 . 7 0 a c s . NW£SE%, 1 6 . 7 0 a c s . S E i S E i , 2 9 . 2 0 a c s .
S e c . 3 4 , T35S, R3E, SL3&M, or a t o t a l o f 6 0 . 0 a c r e s .

SW?£Ei

.2

/Q-/97£_

W.U.C. 97-88 NEW SSCALANTE IRRIGATION COMPANY
Cont'd

W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 21, 66, 88, 1200, 1255 on;
5.00 acs. SW^SE^ Sec. 8, T35S, R3E# SLB&M, or a total of 5.00 acres.
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 21, 66, 88, 1200, 1254 on;
1.00 ac. SW£SE% Sec. 8, T35S, R3E, SLB&M, or a total of 1.00 acre.
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 21, 66, 88, 1200, 1261 on;
11.00 acs. SW^NEi, 0.70 ac. NE&Ei, 2.60 acs. IJBfcSEk, Sec. 28, T35S, R3E, SLB&I,
or a total of 14.30 acres.
W.U.C. USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 21, 66, 88, 1200, 1261, 1262 on;
13.00 acs. NE^SE%, Sec. 28, T35S, R3E, SLB&t, or a total of 13.00 acres.

Total acreage under all categories combined:

2712.28 acres.

Water User;s Claims 6, 12, 19, 21, 66, 88, 587, 1180, 1200, 1250, 1251, 1254, 1255
are limited to the irrigation requirements of 2,563.88 acres.
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FEES FOR APPLICATIONS TO APPROPRIATE WATER IN UTAH
^ — r - p . Flow rate — c.Ls.
^\§\\lL{l^ri^0.0
to 0.1

^ V J? x<&

Cost
$ 10.00

X ^ x e r o-1 t0 °- 5

20 00

-

v

^ ' " ' • c f i ^ ^<;N pyV 0.5 to 1.0
• *--• ^ *,0 *" vvS^v% 1-0 ^0 15.0
—! ->vU ' ff^ °m 15.0
--<
" ( J ^ % CL^

\'/>.

^\<<sy

° t o 20-

30.00
30.00 plus $5 for each cfs above the first cubic foot
100.00
P ^ second.
15 00

-

^/77q^YW/over
20 to 500
-^—^""^ over 500 to 7500
over 7500

30.00
30.00 plus $5 for each 500 a.f: above the first 500
100.00
acre feet.

(This section is not to be filled in by applicant)
STATE ENGINEER'S ENDORSEMENTS

&MIK. 'Application received

^ y e ^ ^ t e r m ^ t a t e E n g i n e e r ' s ollke hy.:Z^J...
^L.S.idzr^ 3^N
2. ^ l . ^ / ' M ^ P r i o r i t y of Application brought down to, on account of...::?-/•
Vt-.-~*
proo-T
n o t L ' ^ v l « ^ VJO\\AW C^.U£.
<?««.. a, / t u q
3^)/^.^> / ^.4/...Application fee,

.., received by...^2^K2

4. , * t ^ * . . / r A / . . . A p p l i c a t ^

Rec. No,

and indexed by...^.

5.^2^^Z-/.^/Application platted \yr^^^f^^f-'-

fpi

*

7
8.

Implication examined by
Application returned,

-«gg:::::::::::::

..Corrected Application resubmitted

or corrected by office..
^

ma^

to State Engineer's office.

9. y^^^../^.//0^^yplication
approved for advertisement by>^2
10. ^#4^«.£.^jf£zNotice to water users prepared by.
11. £L6^X^/?^2JPublication began: was completed .CLdCUX^J:...Sl.
Notice published
12. &^.-Xtyl$&%.'?iQot
slips checked by...
13. /
.
...Application protested

H^Wj7.^./f.^.fcrPub1isher paid by M.E.V. No.^^.^J^
15.
Q
Hearing held by
16.
Field examination by
17. J.UN.1.9J962
Application designated for ^ i S J ^ ^ '
18. .Juns..25.>...19.6?\ppiication copied or photostated by
??.s.
1
19. JSMJS...?**.Implication Jgg™*
20. Conditions:

^dkL

proofread by.

This Application is approved, subject to prior rights, as follows:
a. Actual construction work shall be diligentily prosecuted to completion.
b. Proof of Appropriation shall be submitted to the State Engineer's office by.?i£.Y.f...3?^..i9.9.k
c

....^^
Wayne fl. G r i d d l e State Engineer.

21
Time for making Proof of Appropriation extended lo.^CUs^...3.0.^j9..U.Q^:U^:^^x^^^^ML^J^:^
J./-.JO-76
22.
c?.Z/.32Proof of Appropriation submitted.
23.

Certificate of Appropriation, No

, issued

ATTE.NTI.ON
THJS FORM IS TO BE USED ONLY WHEN WATER HAS BEEN PLACED TO FULL
BENEFICIAL USE
Fortf 152

BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELECTION TO FILE WATER USER'S CLAIM

APPLICATION NO. 1>h°t 4-f fa 7~ gf J
XR
STA^TE OF UTAH

COUI^TY OF
jt being first duly sworn.
say0 that he is the owner of the above application; that the
development contemplated under this application has been completed
and the water placed to beneficial use.
In lieu of submitting "Proof of Appropriation" or
"Certificate of Change", the applicant hereby elects to file a
"Statement of Water User's Claim" or an "Amended Statement of
Wat^r User's Claim" in the pending GENERAL DETERMINATION OF WATER
RIGHTS; and that the applicant requests that said statement be
prepared by the State Engineer and submitted for execution at an
early date.

V

APPLICANT

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

yp^e^W^

, 19 7 ^ .
T&A'C<2£

/; •

-ir.\y

-frf,,

f *n C

f

x^^io^

NOTARY PUBLIC
PUB^ic
NOTARY

37

I hereby certify that on the /7
to

be mailed

copies

of

the

day of May, 1990, I caused

foregoing,

postage

Plaintiff/Appellants' attorneys, as follows:

prepaid,

to

L. R. Gardiner,

Jr., Bullock & Gardiner, 353 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111; and Richard Ruckenbrod, American Plaza II, Suite 400, 57
West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

